IS THERE HISTORY AFTER EUROCENTRISM? GLOBALISM, POSTCOLONIALISM, AND THE DISAVOWAL OF HISTORY Arif Dirlik
Ours would seem to be another age of paradoxes. Localization accompanies globalization, cultural homogenization is challenged by insistence on cultural heterogeneity, denationalization is more than matched by ethnicization. Capitalism at its moment of victory over socialism finds itself wondering about different cultures of capitalism at odds with one another. There is a preoccupation with history when history seems to be increasingly irrelevant to understanding the present. Worked over by postmodernism, among other things, the past itself seems to be up for grabs, and will say anything we want it to say.
It is another one of these paradoxes that I take up in this essay: the paradox of Eurocentrism. The repudiation of Eurocentrism in intellectual and cultural life seems to be such an obvious necessity that it may seem odd to speak of it as a paradox. Yet a good case can be made that Eurocentrism, too, has come under scrutiny and criticism at the very moment of its victory globally. Whether we see in the present the ultimate victory or the impending demise of Eurocentrism depends on what we understand by it, and where we locate it. The widespread assumption in our day that Eurocentrism may be spoken or written away, I will suggest, rests on a reductionist culturalist understanding of Eurocentrism. Rendering Eurocentrism into a cultural phenomenon that leaves unquestioned other locations for it distracts attention from crucial ways in which Eurocentrism may be a determinant of a present that claims liberation from the hold on it of the past. What is at issue is modernity, with all its complex constituents, of which Eurocentrism was the formative moment. Just as Cultural Critique 42-Spring 1999-Copyright 1999 Regents of the University of Minnesota modernity is incomprehensible without reference to Eurocentrism, Eurocentrism as a concept is specifiable only within the context of modernity. Rather than define Eurocentrism from the outset, therefore, I seek to contextualize it in order to restore to it-and the many arguments against it-some sense of historicity.
If Eurocentrism is crucial to thinking modernity, we need to raise the question of whether or not it may be repudiated without a simultaneous disavowal of history. The question necessitates confrontation of Eurocentrism as a historical phenomenon against the background of other "centrisms"-in other words, the ways in which EuroAmerican production, dissemination, and domination of modernity differ in their values and processes from earlier forms of domination such as, say, "Sinocentrism." It is also necessary, in assessing Eurocentrism as a historical problem, to take account of earlier critiques of Eurocentrism. This latter is crucial especially to accounting for the historicity of contemporary critiques of Eurocentrism, in terms of both their relationship to the past and their relationship to contemporary configurations of power.
I suggest by way of conclusion that a radical critique of Eurocentrism must rest on a radical critique of the whole project of modernity understood in terms of the life-world that is cultural and material at once. Modernity in our day is not just EuroAmerican, but is dispersed globally, if not equally or uniformly, in transnational structures of various kinds, in ideologies of development, and the practices of everyday life. It does not just emanate from EuroAmerica understood geographically, nor are its agencies necessarily EuroAmerican in origin. A radical critique of Eurocentrism, in other words, must confront contemporary questions of globalism and postcolonialism, and return analysis to the locations of contemporary struggles over the life-world. I should note here that the critique of Eurocentrism is a diffuse characteristic of all kinds of critiques of power in our day: from feminist to racial critiques. On occasion, it seems as if the problems of the world would be solved if somehow we got rid of Eurocentrism. This, of course, is silly. It not only misses much about Eurocentrism; it ignores even more about the rest of the world. Not the least of what it ignores is that although the agencies that are located in EuroAmerica may be the promoters of Eurocentrism, they are by now not the only ones, and possibly not the most important ones. Eurocentrism may not be global destiny, but it is a problem that needs to be confronted by any serious thinking about global destinies. These problems are too serious to be left in the hands of elites to whom Eurocentrism is an issue of identity in intra-elite struggles for power.
EUROCENTRISM: WHAT AND WHERE?
At one level, what Eurocentrism is and where it is located is sufficiently straightforward. Eurocentrism is crucial to understanding the spatialities and temporalities of modernity, not just in EuroAmerica but globally, from at least the late nineteenth century. The spatial conceptualizations around which we have organized history, from nations to areas to continents and oceans to the Third World and beyond, are in a fundamental sense implicated in a Eurocentric modernity. Even more powerful may be the reworking of temporalities by a Eurocentric conceptualization of the world, where the particular historical trajectory of EuroAmerican societies was to end up as a teleology worldwide in marking time. This was enunciated "theoretically" in the social sciences by the discourse of modernization, in its bourgeois as well as its Marxist formulations. History itself, as Nicholas Dirks puts it succinctly, is "a sign of the modern."1 For the last century, but especially since World War II, Eurocentrism has been the informing principle in our constructions of history-not just in EuroAmerican historiography, but in the spatial and temporal assumptions of dominant historiographies worldwide. EuroAmericans conquered the world, renamed places, rearranged economies, societies, and politics, and erased or drove to the margins premodern ways of knowing space, time, and many other things as well. In the process, they universalized history in their own self-image in an unprecedented manner. Crucial to this self-image was the establishment by the European Enlightenment of a paradigm of the rational humanist subject as the subject of history, armed with reason and science, conquering time and space in the name of universal reason, reorganizing societies to bring them within the realm of rationality, and subjugating alternative historical trajectories to produce a universal history ever moving forward to fulfill the demands of human progress. The paradigm rendered the EuroAmerican experience of history into the fate of humankind, which then could serve as the rationalization for the pain let loose upon the world by its transformative aspirations.
Let us ignore for the moment an immediate objection to such an account of Eurocentrism: that it recapitulates an ideological Eurocentrism worthy of a most unreconstructed Eurocentrist. There is no recognition in this account of the incoherence of Eurocentrism as a historical phenomenon, because it is oblivious to the historicity of Eurocentrism, as well as to the contradictions that both dynamized its history and limited its claims. I will return to those questions in the next section. The immediate issue here is where to locate Eurocentrism.
Culture and discourse would seem to be the most popular choices of location in contemporary answers to Eurocentrism, represented most prominently by postcolonialism and globalism.2 Although quite different, and perhaps even antithetical, in their appreciation of the relationship of the present world situation to the past, postcolonialism and globalism would seem to be at one in their attitudes toward the location of Eurocentrism, or a Eurocentric modernity, which may account for their confounding by some cultural critics.
The differences are deeply methodological and historical. Methodologically speaking, postcolonialism in its most popular forms (in the United States, at least) eschews questions of the structurations of the world in terms of "foundational categories," and stresses local encounters in the formation of identities; it is in many ways driven by a radical methodological individualism, and situationist in its historical explanations. Globalism, on the other hand, draws attention to the structurations of the world by forces that operate at the highest level of abstraction and, in some of its versions, find in such abstraction the reaffirmation of the scientistic promises of social theory. Equally interesting may be their differences in the relationships they posit between the present and the past. Armed with the insights of the present, postcolonialists proceed to reinterpret the past with those very same insights. In this perspective, Eurocentrism, rather than shape history, appears to have been an ideological cover thrown over the past to disguise the complexity of local interactions; postcolonialism then offers a way to dis-cover the past in its true complexity, more often than not expressed in the idea of "hybridity." In contrast to this presentist colonization of the past, globalism proclaims a "rupture" between a "present condition of globality and its many possible pasts."3 Its is a consciousness of totality that must be distinguished from similar consciousnesses of earlier periods; what it does, however, is to deny to Eurocentrism its claims to the creation of such a totality ("its many pasts"), and opens up the possibility that the Others of EuroAmerica may have been partners in its creation.
Although I have no wish to reduce intellectual orientations that claim no coherence for themselves to one or another of their articulations, the differences to which I point above may be illustrated through two statements by those who have gained some reputation as spokespeople of postcolonialism and globalism, respectively.4 Criticism that has caught the imagination of post-Reagan post-Thatcher scholars in the United States and the United Kingdom may not be very surprising, as it points merely to the importance of context in the reception of ideas. The same may be said of globalism, which also covers a wide range of intellectual and political orientations: from leftists who look to a cosmopolitan world to rational-choice political scientists who would make sure that cosmopolitanism live up to the demands of scientific ways of knowing the world-read EuroAmerican hegemony. The problem is not quite novel. Capital has long sought globalization. So have leftists, but not quite in the same way. What seems to be different about our times is the willingness of leftists to buy into the visions of globalization offered by capital. The editors of several influential volumes on postcolonial criticism write that:
European imperialfsm took various forms in different times and places and proceeded both through conscious planning and contingent occurrences. As a result of this complex development something occurred for which the plan of imperial expansion had not bargained: the immensely prestigious and powerful imperial culture found itself appropriated in projects of counter-colonial resistance which drew upon the many indigenous and local hybrid processes of self-determination to defy, erode and sometimes supplant the prodigious power of imperial cultural knowledge. Post-colonial literatures are a result of this interaction between imperial culture and the complex of indigenous cultural practices. As a consequence, postcolonial theory has existed for a long time before that particular name was used to describe it. 5 Postcolonialism, then, is merely the current expression of forms of knowledge that have been around for a long time, except that there was no consciousness of it earlier. That those who are convinced of the discursive construction of knowledge should be oblivious to the positivistic implications of such an assertion is nothing short of remarkable.
By contrast, advocates of globalism leave no doubt about the break they seek to accomplish between the present and the past, including a break between a present condition and the factors that may have brought about such a condition. Roland Robertson, an enthusiastic advocate of globalization of social theory, writes:
I argue that systematic comprehension of the macrostructuration of world order is essential to the viability of any form of contemporary theory and that such comprehension must involve analytical separation of the factors which have facilitated the shift towards a single world-e.g., the spread of capitalism, western imperialism and the development of a global media system-from the general and global agency-structure (and/or culture) theme. While the empirical relationship between the two sets of issues is of great importance (and, of course, complex) conflation of them leads us into all sorts of difficulties and inhibits our ability to come to terms with the basic and shifting terms of the contemporary world order.6
The projects of postcolonialism and globalism are prima facie antithetical: the one repudiating all structurations but the local, the other aiming to uncover global structures; the one situationally historicist, the other seeing in complex empirical relations an obstacle to the formulation of grand theories; the one reenvisioning the past, the other proclaiming a break with it.
And yet they stand to one another in the relationship of the local to the global, and share in common a desire to break down the boundaries (or structures) that may intervene between the two. In the phraseology of one author who seeks to reconcile postcolonialism and globalism, one essential, underlying truth must be pointed out. Most of these peripheral postmodern effects and claims I have been recording stem directly from decomposition, under the contemporary phase of globalization, of the two fundamental assumptions of the three worlds theory.... The cultural borders authorized/enforced under that theory yield to perception of cultural interpenetration and transgression as the normal state in both the demystified past and the avant-garde present. And the evolutionary timeline along which the three worlds theory ranks cultures is cut up into discontinuously segmented, free-floating "realities," with even more transgressive an effect, making the primitive postmodern, and startlingly juxtaposing, not only different cultures and life-styles, but even distinct epochs. 7 In reading this statement, we need to remember that the "three worlds theory" was embedded in the Eurocentric mapping of the world. For the immediate purposes here, Buell brings together postcolonialism and globalism in such a way as to articulate their common points in spite of the differences that I have stressed above: there is an assumption in both cases that culture is the site on which Eurocentrism needs to be challenged, and a disavowal of history in spite of differences toward the relationship between the present and the past. Whereas postcolonialists make no secret of the prominence they assign to culture in their stress on identity formations and negotiations, someone like Robertson is equally anxious in his discussion of globalization to separate "agency-structure (and/or culture) theme" from the forces that account for the emergence of globalization in the first place.8 It may be that for globalists no less than for postcolonialists, cultural boundaries are easier to negotiate than the boundaries of economic, social, and political power, which "inhibit" coming "to terms with the basic and shifting terms of the contemporary world order." It may not be too surprising, in light of the culturalism implicit in such declarations not just of the autonomy but of the priority of culture, that postcolonialism and globalism also share in a disavowal of history. Anthony Smith observes that there is something "timeless about the concept of a global culture," which, "widely diffused in space ... is cut off from any past."9 Timelessness is clearly visible in the statement from Buell, which reorders many pasts into some kind of a postmodern pastiche. It is equally visible in the statement from Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin, for whom the past was not in any way significantly different from the present, but did not know it until the present articulated for it its potential consciousness.
The question at issue here should be obvious by now. Can Eurocentrism be grasped in its significance without reference to the structures of power that it implies? Conversely, can the present, and its many claims against and over the past, be understood in their full historicity, without reference to the past perspectives it seeks to erase, either through colonization or through assertions of rupture with the past? Both questions require consideration of Eurocentrism as historical phenomenon, its formations, and the agencies that have enabled it to serve as a formative moment in not just a EuroAmerican but a global modernity.10
EUROCENTRISM IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF HISTORY
The argument I offer here may be stated simply: Eurocentrism as a historical phenomenon is not to be understood without reference to the structures of power that EuroAmerica produced over the last five centuries, which in turn produced Eurocentrism, globalized its effects, and universalized its historical claims. Those There seems to be some anxiety in contemporary thinking that to raise anew the question of these structures is to open the way to some kind of "functionalism" that once again reduces social phenomena to a few of its elements.12 Let us leave aside the question that culturalist functionalism may be as much a functionalism as any other. To recognize a multiplicity of phenomena that coincide historically and appear in structural and structuring relationships of one kind or another requires neither a reduction of those phenomena to one or more of their numbers nor that we ignore the relationships of contradiction between them, that in effect serve to undermine efforts to functionalize the structure. In fact, it is these relationships, in their totality and particularity as well as their functionality and contradictoriness, that enable a coherent grasp of differences in history-not self-referential localized differences that "result in an utter particularism in which history becomes a meaningless jumble of stories with no connection to each other,"13 as in much of the postcolonial alternative, or deterritorialized totalities that have no clear spatial and temporal referents, as in the globalist alternatives.
The complexity of Eurocentrism becomes even more daunting if we note that Eurocentrism, as we have it now, is hardly a EuroAmerican phenomenon. Much of what we associate with Eurocentrism is now internal to societies worldwide, so that to speak of "Europe and Its Others" itself appears as an oxymoronic distraction. Legacies of EuroAmerica are everywhere, from global structures to daily economic practices, from state formations to household practices, from ideologies of development to cultures of consumption, from feminism to the centering in politics of race and ethnicity. Ashis Nandy, like Frantz Fanon in an earlier day, locates them in the psyches of "Europe's Others."14 They are also in the ways we think the world, from theorizations about society to thinking about history. Even where claims are made these days to premodern and, therefore, pre-"historical" ways of knowing, they fail to convince because their own efforts to refute a modernist historicism are conditioned by a selfconsciousness about their own historicity. And how would we write the world without the legacies of Eurocentric mappings? Writing the world, no less than anti-Eurocentrism itself, may be incomprehensible without reference to those same legacies. If today we may find it impossible to think the world without reference to classes, genders, and so on, premoderns (and maybe even pre-postmoderns) would have been surprised that identities are negotiable, as one negotiates commodities in the marketplace.
The recognition of the pervasiveness of Eurocentrism in its various dimensions in many ways reveals the limitations of a preoccupation with "Europe and Its Others." That juxtaposition may still make sense with reference to the past, when a separation could be assumed between Europeans and others, which would play an important part both in the construction of others and in the construction of Eurocentrism. At the present, when more than ever the Others are most visible in their relocations to older colonial centers, they have, so to speak, come home. As a EuroAmerican modernity long has been internalized in the rest of the world, the rest of the world has now entered the interior of EuroAmerica physically and intellectuallywhich, not surprisingly, is also the prime location for the concern with Eurocentrism. Preoccupation with "Europe and Its Others" seems under the circumstances to be a distraction from the confrontation of the victory of Eurocentrism, which is evident above all in the rendering of EuroAmerica and its many products into objects of desire globally. The contemporary concern with Eurocentric constructions of the Other, interestingly (and with some irony), seems to provide endless occasion for speaking about EuroAmerica, perpetuating the Eurocentrism it would formally repudiate-which may be the form this desire takes among intellectuals. At the risk of simpleminded psychologizing, anti-Eurocentrism strikes me above all as the mirror image of this desire; not so much as a negative compensation for it but rather as a demand for admission of non-EuroAmerican cultural elements into the interior of a world that has been shaped already by its historical legacy in a Eurocentric modernity. What, after all, is multiculturalism that calls for the recognition of cultural relics or heritages without challenging the structures of power that are the products of EuroAmerican domination of the world, and imbued through and through with its values? These same circumstances may have something to tell us about why globalism and postcolonialism, in their very contradictoriness, have caught the imagination of many as ways to deal with such a contemporary situation-even though in their different ways they may evade the most fundamental and pressing question: whether or not there is an Outside to Eurocentrism in a world that has been worked over by the forces of modernity.
If Eurocentrism understood as a cultural phenomenon is insufficient as a critique of EuroAmerican domination of the world, which was hardly just a "discursive" domination but has been embedded in structures of power, the power of Eurocentrism itself is not to be grasped without reference to these same structures. This is not to say that culture and discourses are insignificant, but only to reiterate that they are insufficient as explanations of the world; the separation of culture and discourse into realms apart from the material is itself very modern. For the same reason, to argue for a reconnection of culture and discourse to the materiality of everday life is not to argue for a return to an earlier privileging of political economy, but rather to open up new ways of thinking the connection under contemporary circumstances-which implies also rethinking the connections that were repudiated under the regime of modernity. Eurocentric modernity then appears as one way of connecting modes of living and cultures, rather than as establishing a "scientific" and, therefore, forever valid, causal relationship between the two. The problem, as a historical problem, then, is to inquire why Eurocentric ways of representing this relationship have acquired such power. Eurocentrists may suggest that it is the power of EuroAmerican cultures. I would like to suggest here that it is power that dynamizes the claims of culture; contrary to some versions of cultural studies that conflate power and culture until they become indistinguishable, it is important, I think, to distinguish the two so as to enable a more historical treatment of the relationship. The issue here is not one of ethical judgment or choice. The issue rather is ethical domination. And cultural domination is hardly its own justification. Neither Eurocentrism nor the contemporary challenges to it can be understood without reference to elements outside of the strictly cultural-which, needless to say, raises significant questions about what we mean by the cultural.
To recognize Eurocentrism as a historical phenomenon it is necessary to view it within the context of other instances of domination, of which Eurocentrism was neither the first instance nor is likely to be the last. Such a historical perspective may also provide clues for a more thoroughgoing critique of power and domination than is cur- Eurocentrism as compared to earlier "centrisms" is universal in three senses. First is the omnipresence globally of the institutions and cultures of EuroAmerican modernity. Although the effects of this modernity may not be uniformly or equally visible on all the surface implied by global, it is nevertheless everywhere forcing widely different peoples into parallel historical trajectories (which, I stress, does not imply identity). Second, it is universal in the sense that Eurocentrism may be diffused through the agencies of non-EuroAmericans, which underlines the importance of a structural appreciation of Eurocentrism.21 Finally, although Eurocentrism may not be universal in the sense that it permits no outside, it is nevertheless the case that it has become increasingly impossible to imagine outsides to it, if by outside we understand places outside of the reach of EuroAmerican practices. It is not that there are no outsides, but that those outsides must of necessity be conceived of as post-Eurocentric, as products of contradictions generated by the dialectic between a globalizing EuroAmerica and places that struggle against such globalization. What this implies is a common history that of necessity provides the point of departure even for imagining outsides or alternatives to Eurocentrism. Eurocentrism, in other words, is not to be challenged by questioning the values that emanate from EuroAmerica. It requires challenging values and structures that are already part of a global legacy.
In a world that does not operate according to the norms of functionalism, but rather of contradictions, the globalization of Eurocentrism inevitably brings multifaceted contradictions into the very interior of a Eurocentric world, undermining at every moment the integrity of that world, beginning with the notion of Eurocentrism itself. The contemporary critique of Eurocentrism is driven not by victimization by Eurocentrism, but by empowerment within it. Foremost among the critics of Eurocentrism in our day are not those who are marginalized by Eurocentrism, or left out of its structures of power, but those who claim "hybridities" that give access to both Eurocentrism and to its Others, probably more of the former than the latter. If Orientalism was a product of EuroAmericans located in "contact zones" outside of EuroAmerica, on the margins of nonEuroAmerican societies, anti-Eurocentrism is a product of contact zones located at the hearts of EuroAmerica, or in transnational structures and circuits of power. As contact zones earlier presented EuroAmericans with a choice between civilizing mission and dissolution into "barbarism," the new contact zones present intellectuals of Third World origin with a choice between "bridging" cultures that, given the persistent inequalities between societies, may mean further invasion of the rest of the world by the structures of power over which EuroAmerica continues to preside, or burning the bridges, so that alternatives might be thinkable to a Eurocentric vision of human futures.
The contrast between building bridges and burning bridges offers a convenient way of identifying differences between contemporary and past radicalisms in their attitudes toward Eurocentrism. As late as the sixties and the seventies, radical evaluations of Eurocentrism insisted on intimate ties between questions of cultural domination and political economy, more often than not encompassed by the term imperialism. Third World national liberation struggles, synthesizing in locally particular ways goals of national independence and socialized economies, sought to "delink" national economies from the global markets of capitalism, to reorganize those economies in accordance with local needs, and to achieve "cultural revolutions" against EuroAmerican cultures of capitalism that would create citizenries responsive to national needs. In First World social sciences, insistence on considerations of political economy became the means to challenge the culturalism of modernization discourses that blamed "backwardness" on the native traditions and cultures of Third World societies.
From a contemporary perspective, both these earlier radical movements and their articulations in new social-science theorizations (such as "world-system analysis") appear, contrary to their claims, to have been dominated by the master narratives and "foundational" assumptions of Eurocentrism. And to a large extent, this is plausible. In spite of the revolt against capitalism, national liberation movements for the most part remained wedded to the developmentalism of EuroAmerican modernity. They also remained within the spatial webs of Eurocentrism in taking for granted the spatial arrangements of modernity; most prominently the idea of a Third World itself. The nation-form was taken for granted, with the consequence that the nation was rendered into the location for culture, ignoring that the idea of a national culture could be realized only through the colonization of diverse local cultures.22
Other aspects of contemporary critiques of the radical assumptions of an earlier day seem a great deal more problematic, and may have more to say about the present than the past. The charge of essentialism is a favorite weapon in the arsenal of postcolonialism. It has been brought to bear on ideas of the Third World, Third World nationalism, and so on, which says less about the historical unfolding of these ideas than about efforts to create straw targets against which to validate postcolonialism. Although Third World may have carried essentialist connotations in modernization discourse, this was hardly the way it was understood by the "Third Worlders," to whom Third World connoted anything but the identity of the societies so described; rather, Third Worldness was a condition of national situations, contingent on relationships between capitalist and noncapitalist societies. In revolutionary nationalisms, national cultures were not the givens of some tradition or other but were conceived of as cultures yet to be created through national struggles for liberation. Foundational categories were anything but foundational; I have described elsewhere how, in the context of a guerrilla revolution in China, for instance, there was considerable attention to the overdetermined and locally contingent nature of social categories, especially of class.23 That these revolutions worked from a EuroAmerican spatiality means only that present realities provided the point of departure for thinking alternatives to them. Most bizarre is the idea, rather common these days, that to speak of oppression and imperialism as determinants of these revolutions is to ignore or suppress the subjectivities of the oppressed,24 when these movements themselves represented nothing short of the reassertion of native subjectivities, and That these questions are missing from much of the contemporary discussion of globalism and postcolonialism may not be too surprising, because for all their claims to radicalism, and significant differences between them, both globalism and postcolonialism represent accommodations to contemporary configurations of power in which they are complicit. This is quite evident in the case of globalism, which is promoted by capital and its institutions, for whom globalization is anything but a matter of culture. In this perspective, globalism is little more than a recognition that capital is no longer just EuroAmerican, that there are successful participants in it who hail from other locations, and that other than EuroAmerican cultures must be incorporated into the structures and operations of capital because transnationalism itself implies the interiorization of difference-so long as they recognize the primacy of those structures in the first place.25 In social-science theory-or history, for that matter-these Others must be recognized in the fullness of their "traditions" and indigenous subjectivities, which are denied in discourses of imperialism and oppression. Never mind that social-science theory, into which differences are interpellated, itself represents a kind of thinking about the world grounded in Eurocentric structures of power. Hence it becomes possible to speak of different "civil societies," grounded in different social configurations, as if the term civil society were innocent in its political implications. And, of course, "rational choice theory" represents a transcending of cultural differences in its "scientificity," as if science as a mode of comprehending the world had nothing to do with "culture." One foundation representative remarks in support of globalization that "Western theories" are not "for the rest of the world to adopt."26 There is no indication in the statement that "Western" itself might be redundant, as it may be implicit already in the term theory.
Unlike globalization, which is founded in the developmentalist assumptions of capitalism, postcolonialism seems to me to be more of an accommodation with a current structure of power than an apology for it. The present situation is better described as postrevolutionary rather than postcolonial, because while the immediate response to postcoloniality as a historical phenomenon was revolution, contemporary postcolonialism eschews revolutionary options for accommodation to the capitalist world-system. The postcolonial rush to culture is an escape not only from the structures of political economy, but more importantly from revolutionary radicalisms of the past, which are now denied not only contemporary relevance, but even past significance. Postcolonialism's complicity with contemporary configurations of power rests in its explicit repudiation of structures and "foundational" categories, which obviate the need to address the question of structured power in considerations of change, but also in its culturalism. Localized encounters and identity politics seem to serve in postcolonialism not as a refinement of, but as a substitute for, structured inequalities and struggles against it. More significant may be the rereading of the past with such a "methodology," which also serves to erase the memory of more radical struggles for culture and identity, and renders localism into a metanarrative that postcolonialism supposedly repudiates. What is remarkable about postcolonialism methodologically and conceptually is that for all its objections to "essentialism," it is based on presumptions of essentialized identities, which is implicit in notions of "hybridity," "third space," and so on.
Repudiation of foundational categories also relieves it of the obligation to confront "differences" along the fault lines of classes, genders, races, and so on, which all become subject to negotiations of one kind or another. Postcolonialism, repudiating Eurocentric spatializations, ironically also returns us to pre-World War II spaces, where spaces established by colonial empires are acknowledged on unguarded occasions to provide spaces for theorizing about culture and identities.27 Most important, however, may be that in its repudiation of the structures of political economy in the name of discourses and culture, postcolonialism returns us past an earlier concern with political economy to the culturalism of modernization discourse. Its own discourse on culture is quite different, needless to say, than the spaceless and timeless cultures presumed by modernization discourse, but it is at one with the latter in elevating culture to primacy in social and cultural theory.
The parallel has interesting implications. Culturalism in modernization discourse served to conceal inequalities in the realms of econ- To affirm the historical role that Eurocentrism has played in shaping the contemporary world is not to endow it with some normative power, but to recognize the ways in which it continues to be an intimate part of the shaping of the world, which is not going to disappear with willful acts of its cultural negation. One aspect of Eurocentrism that infused both earlier revolutionary ideologies and the accommodationist alternatives of the present seems to me to be especially important, perhaps more important for the historian than for others because it is complicit in our imagination of temporalities:
developmentalism. The notion that development is as natural to humanity as air and water is deeply embedded in our consciousness, and yet development as an idea is a relatively recent one in human history. As Arturo Escobar has argued forcefully in a number of writings, development as a discourse is embedded not just in the realm of ideology, but in institutional structures that are fundamental to the globalization of capital.36 If globalism is a way of promoting these structures by rendering their claims into scientific truths, postcolonialism serves as their alibi by not acknowledging their presence. Historians, meanwhile, continue to write history as if attaining the goals of development were the measure against which the past can be evaluated. That, I think, is the most eloquent testimonial to the implication of our times in the continuing hegemony of capital, for which the disavowal of an earlier past serves as disguise. It also indicates where the tasks may be located for a radical agenda appropriate to the present: in questioning contemporary dehistoricizations of the present and the past, and returning inquiry to the search for alternatives to developmentalism. However we may conceive such alternatives, they are likely to be post-Eurocentric, recognizing that any radical alternatives to modernity's forms of domination must confront not just the cultures, but also the structures of modernity. At any rate, it seems to me that we need a reaffirmation of history and historicity at this moment of crisis in historical consciousness, especially because history seems to be irrelevant-either because of its renunciation at the centers of power where a postmodernism declares a rupture with the past, unable to decide whether such a rupture constitutes a celebration or a denunciation of capitalism, or, contradictorily, because of an affirmation of premodernity among those who were the objects of modernity, who proclaim in order to recover their own subjectivities that modernity made no difference after all. A historical epistemology will not resolve the contradiction, or provide a guide to the future, but it might serve at least to clarify the ways in which the present uses and abuses the past, and serve as a reminder of our own historicitywhy we say and do things differently than they were said or done in the past. Ours is an age when there is once again an inflation of claims to critical consciousness. These claims are often based on an expanded consciousness of space. We need to remind ourselves, every time we speak of the constructedness of some space or other, that it 21. There is plenty of evidence of this, including in the "civilizing mission" of the nation-state. One such piece of evidence is almost irresistible in the ironies it presents. A BBC report on Tibet, broadcast on October 18, 1998, had Tibetans complaining that in addition to the usual practices of religious suppression, the Chinese were now introducing capitalism to Tibet, introducing new hardships into the lives of the people. The "socialist" government of China has always assumed the burden of "civilizing" minority groups supposedly at an earlier stage of historical development; but now it is capitalism that provides the medium.
22. It needs to be emphasized here that while contemporary theory has problematized the nation-form, contemporary political reality points in an opposite direction. The nation persists, minus its earlier revolutionary vision. If anything, nationalism in our day has taken the form of virulent nativism. 
